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THE CATEGORICAL DEFINITION OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL
PROPERTY UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA SELECTIVE
SALES AND USE TAX ACT
By MARVIN GARFINKEL *
"A TAX attorney's dream and a tax collector's nightmare." This char-
"Aacterization by Pennsylvania's Governor George M. Leader 1 of cer-
tain amendments to Pennsylvania's Selective Sales and Use Tax Act 2 is equally
applicable in many respects to the act itself. Although the problems of in-
terpretation created by this law do often resemble a confused and unpleasant
detachment from reality, the act may be considered a tax attorney's dream
only in the sense that it must inevitably breed extensive litigation. This is
particularly true of that unique aspect of the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act
-the categorical definition of property the sale or use of which is subject to
tax. This article will deal with the more important problems related to this
feature of the act. The application of various principles of statutory in-
terpretation will be analyzed in an attempt to interpret and correlate the
relevant provisions of the law. Particular attention will be paid to basic
problems of statutory construction which must be resolved before a rational
and consistent approach to the act's categorical feature is possible.
I.
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
The statute, officially titled the "Selective Sales and Use Tax Act", is
Pennsylvania's first permanent sales tax law.' The basic act became effective
* B.A., 1951, Pomona College; L.L.B., 1954, University of Pennsylvania; Deputy Attorney
General of Pennsylvania, 1955-1957; Member of the Philadelphia Bar and of the firm of Ehrlich,
Narin and Garfinkel.
1 On March 26, 1957, Governor Leader, appearing before an extraordinary joint session of
the Pennsylvania General Assembly, asked the Legislature to recall House Bill No. 337, a sales
tax amending bill which was on his desk after passing both legislative houses. The Governor
criticized both the substantive and procedural -provisions of the amendments and asked the Legis-
lature to re-examine the bill and write an "honorable and workable tax bill." Later, after the Legis-
lature failed to act on his request, House Bill No. 337 became law on April 5, 1957 as Act No.
24 of the 1957 session of the General Assembly, P. L. 34. In permitting the bill to become law
without his approval, the Governor suggested to the General Assembly that it appoint its own tax
study commission to immediately write a more equitable sales tax. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin,
April 5, 1957, p. 1, col. 5 and 6, continued to p. 15, col. I and 2. Philadelphia Inquirer, April 5,
1957, p. 3, col. 6.
2 Act of March 6, 1956, P. L. 1228,'as amended by the Acts of May 24, 1956, P. L. 1707;
April 5, 1957, No. 24, P. L. 34; May 9, 1957, No. 51, P. L. 114; July 8, 1957, No. 297; July
8, 1957, No. 323; July 8, 1957, No. 326; 72 P.S. § 3403 (Supp. 1956).
3 The Emergency Relief Sales Tax Act of August 19, 1932 (Ex. Sess.), P. L. 92, 72 P.S.
§ 3282 (1949), was in effect for six months and imposed a one percent tax. The Consumers Sales
11]
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March 7, 1956, the confused product of an extraordinarily long legislative
session dominated by a split on fiscal policy between a Democratic Governor
and a Republican majority in the State Senate.
4
As originally introduced in the General Assembly the bill, which in
amended form was signed into law on March 6, 1956, was most aptly titled
the "Selective Retail Tax Act".' In this original form the bill would have
imposed a two percent excise tax upon the "sale, use, storage or other con-
sumption of all tangible personal property purchased at retail after the ef-
fective date of this act . . .". The bill defined "Tangible Personal Property"
by listing seven narrow categories.' Thus, under the bill as introduced trans-
actions involving only a limited class of property would actually have been
subject to tax. The seven categories of taxables included automotive and
aircraft equipment, construction materials, home furnishings, office furniture,
equipment and supplies, radio, phonograph and television receiving equip-
ment, photographic equipment, sporting goods and athletic equipment, cos-
metics, furs and jewelry. Although these classifications were quite arbitrary
and discriminatory they were without question selective. As introduced this
bill was, therefore, not apparently intended to be a broad base retail sales
tax. The bill passed the House without major amendment except that lug-
gage was added to the property subject to tax. After second reading in the
Senate it was recommitted to the Finance Committee. The bill, as re-reported
from committee, listed 17 categories of property subject to tax and, at this
point, began to resemble the present act, thus becoming a general sales tax
law in practice although possibly not in theory. The Senate committee had
renamed the bill "The Selective Sales and Use Tax Act", a short title which
Tax Act of July 13, 1953, P. L. 389, 72 P.S. § 3407 (Supp. 1956), was in effect from Sep-
tember 1, 1953, until it expired on August 31, 1955, and also imposed a one percent tax. This
act 'was complemented by the Use and Storage Tax Act of July 13, 1953, P. L. 377, 72 P.S.
§ 3406 (Supp. 1956), which was effective for the same period. The City of Philadelphia also
enacted a local two percent sales tax ordinance on February 8, 1938, effective to December 31, 1938.
4 Governor Leader favored a state income tax as the major source of critically needed ad-
ditional revenue while the Senate majority held out for a sales tax. Early in the session the
Governor recommended the adoption of a classified income tax law in which the tax rate pro-
gressed from one percent on wages and other non-enumerated income through two percent on
business and professional income, four percent on rents and royalties, five percent on dividend in-
come and six percent on net income from long terr0 capital gains. House Bill No. 878, General
Assembly of Pennsylvania, Session of 1955 as infroduced on April 25, 1955. Administration
leaders in the legislature later introduced a Manufacturers Excise Tax Bill. House Bill No.
1879, General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Session of 1955 as amended on second reading in Senate
on December 12, 1955, Printer's No. 1228. After both of these proposals failed later in the ses-
sion the administration backed a flat two percent income tax based on net taxable income as
determined for federal income tax purposes. House Bill No. 1960, General Assembly of Penn-
sylvania, Session of 1955, as amended on second reading in House on January 16, 1956, Printer's
No. 1373.
5 House Bill No. 2009 (Pink), General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Session of 1955. As intro-
duced on February 7, 1956.
6Section 2 (g), House Bill No. 2009 (Pink), General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Session
of 1955.
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failed properly to describe the bill since it had lost essentially all its selectivity,
and, although it was a use tax, it was not a sales tax. It did not impose a
tax upon the sale of property, but rather taxed only the use of property and im-
posed an obligation upon the vendor to collect the use tax. Substantial ques-
tion later arose as to whether only retail transactions were subject to tax.
Pennsylvania's Attorney General, who following adoption, was called upon
to interpret the Act, considered it possible that the bill imposed a duplicate
tax on the same property at each level of distribution.' After the House non-
concurred in the Senate amendments, the bill went to a joint conference
committee. The only major changes made by this committee involved elim-
ination of electricity and telephone and telegraph services from the property
categories,' and the inclusion of the controversial stamp plan for collection
of tax, which had previously been removed from the bill by the Senate com-
mittee.' In this form the bill was finally approved.
The need for radical amendment soon became apparent. An amending
bill, which was introduced into the House twenty days after the enactment
of the basic statute on March 6, 1956, expeditiously passed both houses in
different form and was sent to a joint conference committee on April 10 where
it remained the subject of extended discussion until a compromise bill was
reported out on May 16. This bill, as finally approved on May 24, 1956,
contained many features considered objectionable both by the Administration,
which at this point sought a broad base general sales tax, and those who felt
that this new tax should not be applicable to particular areas of commercial
activities. The amendments were generally retroactive to March 7, 1956, the
effective date of the original act. As amended, the Selective Sales and Use
See Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, March 11, 1956, p. 10, col. 1; Philadelphia Inquirer,
March 11, 1956, § B, p. 1, col. 6.
8 The effect of this change was to eliminate the proposed application of tax upon the rendition
of these services. It is possible, though, that the rendition of certain other public utility services
is still subject to tax, since the title of the act was not also amended to eliminate reference to an
imposition of tax on public utility services defined as tangible personal property.
9 Article IV of the act of March 6, 1956, P. L. 1228, provided for the use of "prepaid tax
receipts", commonly referred to as "tax stamps". This article of the act being an injection of the
Ohio tax stamp system (see Revised Code of Ohio c. 5739 §§ 5739.03-5739.09 inclusive) into an
act whose other procedural provisions were based on a periodic report and payment procedure.
Section 604 of the March 6, 1956 act provided that Article IV should not be operative until
July 1, 1956. The amending act of May 24, 1956, P. L. 1707, revised certain of the provisions
of Article IV and postponed the operative date of the stamp plan to January 1, 1957, "or as
soon thereafter as practicable: Provided however, That any delay in implementing the provisions
of Article IV shall not affect any other provision of this act." [§ 605 as amended by P. L. 1707).
Litigation pertaining to the constitutionality of the stamp plan precluded the Commonwealth's
implementing Article IV as late as April 5, 1957 when Act No. 24, P. L, 34 became effective
and repealed Article IV. The Governor in permitting House Bill No. 337 to become law as the
Act of April 4, 1957 stated that a significant motivating factor to him was the repeal of the
undesirable stamp plan. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, April 5, 1957, p. 1, col. 5 and 6, con-
tinued to p. 15, col. 1 and 2. Philadelphia Inquirer, April 5, 1957, p. 3, col. 6.
1957.]
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Tax Act imposed a tax upon the sale or use of "tangible personal property" "0
purchased other than for resale. The categorical definition of "tangible per-
sonal property" and the stamp plan, both being basic to the original act, were
retained although the individual categories were somewhat expanded." The
articulation of specific exclusions from tax, redesignated as Section 203, was
also expanded.
The law remained in this form until the new Legislature which con-
vened in January, 1957, adopted House Bill No. 337.12 The effect of this
bill on the categorical features of the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act was
relatively minor."
II.
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE ACT RESPECTING APPLICATION OF TAx
Section 201 of the Act imposes a tax at the rate of three percent of pur-
chase price on each separate sale at retail within the Commonwealth of "tan-
gible personal property" and also imposes a tax at the same rate upon the use
within the Commonwealth of "tangible personal property" purchased at re-
tail on or after March 7, 1956."4 The use tax need not be paid by a person
10 See appendix for full statutory provision. The imposition section of the original March
6, 1956 act levied a tax upon ". . . the use within the Commonwealth of all tangible personal
property, as defined in this act, purchased after the effective date of this act." Act of March 6,
1956, P. L. 1228, § 201 (a). The phrase, "as defined in this act", was eliminated by the
amending Act of May 24, 1956, P. L. 1707. This change is without significance. The draftsmen
of the amending act were of the opinion that it was necessary either to eliminate the phrase "as
defined in this act" at his point, or to insert it at every other point in the act where the term
"tangible personal property" was used. Otherwise, it could reasonably be argued that where the
phrase was not used, the common meaning of the term "tangible personal property" was intended,
rather than the artificial categorical definition. One of the major defects in the original March
6, 1956 act was that the manufacturer's exemption, as incorporated in the Section 2 (j) definition
of "use", applied only to property used or consumed in the manufacture of tangible personal prop-
erty. Pennsylvania's Attorney General was of the opinion that property used in the manufacture
of gasoline, for instance, might not be exempt since gasoline did not come within the categorical
definition of "tangible personal property".
11 See appendix for relevant statutory provisions.
12 Act of April 5, 1957, No. 24, P. L. 34. During the controversy between the Governor and
the Legislature over House Bill No. 337 (See note 2, supra), the state Justice Department pre-
pared an analysis of this bill for the Governor. This analysis, which was published for the
benefit of all interested persons, alerted the state legislature to the need for immediate and ex-
tensive amendment of the poor administrative provisions of the 1956 Act, the effectiveness of
which had been further reduced by House Bill No. 337. The Act of May 9, 1957, No. 51, P. L.
114, incorporated these procedural changes into the law while the Act of July 8, 1957, No. 323,
changed certain provisions regarding tax returns, refund procedures and time limitations on assess-
ments. The Act of July 8, 1957, No. 326, reduced the offense of engaging in business without
having a license as required by the Act from a misdemeanor to a summary offense.
15 Minor changes were made to categories eleven and seventeen. A new category, including
certain periodicals and other publications, was added and designated as clause eighteen of
§ 2(1). See appendix for relevant statutory provisions.
"March 7, 1956, was the effective date of the original act which was signed by the Governor
at 11: 53 P. M. on March 6, 1956. Section 604 of the Act of March 6, 1956, P. L. 1228, provided
that the act should take effect the day following final enactment.
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who has paid the sales tax with respect to particular property." The terms
"purchase price", "sale at retail", "tangible personal property" and "use"
are specifically and in many respects quite artificially defined in Section 2,
the general definition section of the act. 6 The incidence of taxation under
the act is thus nearly 1 always dependent upon the meaning of one or more
of these terms "' and, as a result, the vast majority of the problems encoun-
tered under the act involve an interpretation or application of these definitions.
It is in the definition of the term "tangible personal property" that the
structure of the Pennsylvania act departs most radically from other general 10
15 Note the difference between the application of this use tax and that of the use tax of most
other jurisdictions. For instance, § 6201 of The California Revenue and Tax Code, Act of July
1, 1943, as amended in 1948, imposes a tax upon the storage, use or other consumption of prop-
erty purchased after July 1, 1935, for storage, use or other consumption in California. The ex-
pired 1% Pennsylvania Use and Storage Tax Act of July 13, 1953, P. L. 377, enacted in con-
junction with the Consumers Sales Tax Act of July 13, 1953. P. L. 389, also imposed a tax only
upon the use of property purchased for use in the Commonwealth. The New York City Use Tax
is not applicable to the use of property purchased by a user while a non-resident of the City.
A person engaged in commercial or professional activity in the City is not considered to be a non-
resident with respect to the use of property in connection with such activity. N. Y. CITY ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE CODE, § M41-17.1.
The Illinois use tax imposition is similar to the present Pennsylvania imposition, and provides
that where property is used outside the state prior to use in the state the tax base shall be re-
duced by a reasonable amount to represent out-of-state depreciation. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 120,
§ 439.3 (1955). Section 2 (f) (5) of the Pennsylvania Act, as added by the amendment of
May 9, 1957, provides for a similar adjustment of tax base, but only where the property was
originally purchased by the user more than six months prior to the first taxable use in the
Commonwealth.
16 "A legislative body may, in a statute or ordinance, furnish its own definitions of words
and phrases used therein in order to guide and direct judicial determinations of the intendments
of the legislation although such definitions may be different from ordinary usage; it may create
its own dictionary to be applied to the particular law or ordinance in question." Sterling v.
Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 538, 106 A. 2d 793 (1954). This case held that the mercantile license
tax was applicable to receipts from the practice of law under an ordinance in which the imposition
section levied a tax upon annual gross volume of business transacted by persons engaged in busi-
ness. Elsewhere in the act "business" was defined as including the carrying on of any trade,
business, profession, or vocation.
17 Exceptions to this statement arise where the incidence of tax is dependent upon either of
the two subsidiary imposition provisions. Section 203 (i), in addition to excluding from tax
the sale or use of certain wrapping supplies, also provides that ". . . any charge for wrapping or
packaging shall be subject to tax at the rate imposed by section 201." Perhaps, though, the
definition of "purchase price" is even of importance in interpreting this provision, since it might
be argued that the rate of tax imposed by § 201 is "three percent of purchase price" rather than
just "three percent". The interpretation of § 204 providing for an "Alternate Imposition of Tax",
applicable to the short term use of certain property in the Commonwealth, is not dependent upon
the definition of any of these terms.
18 Each of these terms is, of course, also used elsewhere in the act other than in the im-
position provisions. For instance, the unique definition of the term "tangible personal property"
is of significance in determining whether a person is required to have a license under § 301 and
also determining whether exemption certificates must be retained under § 546 (c). Note that
the manufacturer's exemption under §§ 2 (c) (1) and 2 (j) (1) are applicable to certain prop-
erty used in the manufacture of "personal property". The use of the term "tangible personal
property" at this point in the original act of March 6, 1956, was one of the factors which led
to the amendments of May 24, 1956, P. L. 1707. See note 10 supra.
'L A general sales tax may be defined as one applicable to transactions involving a substantial
portion of the corporeal or tangible personal property in general commerce. Such taxes are gen-
erally differentiated from taxes imposed upon the sale or use of such specific commodities or closely
related groups of commodities, such as liquor, tobacco products, liquid fuels and motor vehicles,
which somewhat traditionally have been subject to excise taxes. See Due, The Nature and Struc-
1957.)
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sales tax acts in effect in the United States. The imposition provisions of
general sales tax statutes characteristically impose a tax upon transactions
involving "tangible personal property." Unlike Pennsylvania's act, other
statutes either fail to specifically define the term "tangible personal prop-
erty" 20 and so leave the definition to general common law,21 or define the
term in a non-specific all-inclusive manner. For instance, the California
statute, being of the latter type, defines the term "tangible personal property"
as including:
... personal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt, or
touched, or which is in any other manner perceptible to the senses." 22
In contrast to the provisions of other sales tax statutes, subsection (1)
of section 2 of the Pennsylvania act defines "tangible personal property" by
setting forth eighteen clauses, often referred to as categories.2 A major dif-
ficulty is that this subsection (1) does not set forth a policy of interpretation
relative to the interrelationship of these categories. Note that categories four
and five are particularly inclusive and non-selective in character. Category
four includes "furnishings, appliances, supplies, fittings, ornaments, furniture,
equipment and accessories for home, business, industrial or commercial use,
for indoor or outdoor purposes" while category five includes "business, in-
dustrial, professional and commercial supplies, equipment and machines of
all types, including parts and accessories purchased for or used in connection
therewith". Also note that limitations or exclusions are set forth within
certain categories.2 For instance, category nine consists of "jewelry, watches,
clocks, silverware, dishes, tableware, pottery and related articles, but not in-
cluding religious articles". Category seven includes "all smoking and tobacco
products, except cigarettes". These limitations or exclusions within categories
are, however, not the only limiting or exclusionary provisions of the act.
Section 203 of the act sets forth thirteen specific exclusions from tax. Ex-
ture of Sales Taxation, 9 VAND. L. REV. 123, 124 (1956). The Pennsylvania Selective Sales and
Use Tax Act is properly classified as a general sales tax act. Note that the Wyoming Selective
Sales Tax Act of February 24, 1937, Ch. 102 of Laws of 1937, is both in form and substance also
a general sales tax act, notwithstanding its name. In the case of excise taxes on specifics, the rate
of tax is usually dependent upon quantity considerations rather than upon the value of the prop-
erty incident to the transaction.
20See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 120, §§ 440-453 (1955); REV. CODE OF OHIO, § 5739.01
(1953); OKLA. STATS. TIT. 68, § 1251a, (1941).
2t "Bouvier defines the term 'tangible property' as follows: 'That which may be felt or
touched; it must necessarily be corporeal, but it may be real or personal.' " Crosswell v. Jones,
52 F. 2d 880 (E.D.S.C. 1931); Cf. Curry v. Alabama Power Co., 243 Ala. 53, 8 So. 2d 521
(1942), which holds that for the purpose of the Alabama Use Tax, electricity is tangible
personal property since it has mass (electrons) and can be tasted, detected by the sense of smell
and perceived by touch.
22 CAL. REVENUE AND TAXATION CODE § 6016, (1943). Cf. FLORIDA STATS., C. 212, § 212.02
(12); N. Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE, §N41-1.6.
22 Subsection (1) of § 2 is set forth in the appendix.
24 Categories 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 17, 18.
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clusions are also incorporated into the definitions of both "sale at retail" and
use
To take a positive approach, there are three distinct criteria upon
which the taxability of a transaction is dependent. First, a transaction is sub-
ject to tax only if the property involved comes within the categorical definition
of "tangible personal property" set forth in section 2 (1). On this basis,
transactions involving exclusively 2 either real property, intangible personal
property (in the common sense), or the rendition of a service are not included
within any taxable category and are, therefore, not subject to tax. Likewise,
transactions exclusively involving corporeal personal property which is not
included in any category are not taxable since, for the purpose of the Selective
Sales and Use Tax Act, such property is not considered to be "tangible per-
sonal property". Second, a transaction is subject to tax only if considered
under the act to be either a "sale at retail" or a "use". A "sale at retail"
under the act includes also certain rental " and quasi-service transactions.2"
A "use" is subject to tax only if the property being used was "purchased at
retail" on or after March 7, 1956.8 The transfer of property for the purpose
of resale is not subject to tax, such transaction being specifically excluded
25 Transactions involving both "tangible personal property", as defined by the act, and other
property, may entail rather complex problems. This is especially true where the consideration
incident to the transfer of the "tangible personal property" is not both separately stated and rea-
sonable. Consider for instance the lease of an equipped commercial facility such as a restaurant.
In these situations the Department of Revenue generally takes the position that where the parties
have failed to separately state the purchase price incident to the transfer of the "tangible personal
property", the tax is based upon the consideration incident to the entire transaction. More often
than not, this position may be legally valid, although each fact situation demands a consideration
of various provisions of the act. A detailed analysis of this problem is beyond the scope of this
article.
26 Section 2 (I) defines "sale at retail" as including "Any transfer for a consideration of the
ownership, custody or possession of tangible personal property.. .". A rental is a transfer of
possession or custody. The title of the act as amended by the Act of May 24, 1956, P. L. 1707,
imposes a tax upon the ". . . sale, use, storage, rental or consumption of certain tangible personal
property. . .". Section 2 (e) of the act defines "purchase at retail" as including the acquisition for
a consideration of the ownership, custody or possession of tangible personal property. The § 2 (f)
definition of "purchase price" includes the consideration incident to a lease. A person using rented
property within the Commonwealth must therefore pay either a sales tax on the rental transaction
or a use tax with respect to the use. The tax base is generally dependent upon the rental payments
except as otherwise provided by clause (4) of this subsection which sets forth a distinct tax base
applicable to rental transactions. A retention after March 7, 1956 of the possession, custody or a
license to use or consume property pursuant to a rental or lease arrangement is considered a trans-
fer subject to tax (§§ 2 (e) and 2 (j)).
27 E. g. linen rentals. See § 2 (f) (4) of the Act as amended on May 24, 1956, P. L. 1707,
72 P.S. 3403-2 (f) (4) (Supp. 1956).
28 See note 14 supra. A rational interpretation of this limitation is that property is sub'ect
to tax only when the user purchased it on or after March 7, 1956. Although the § 2 (e) defini-
tion of "purchase at retail" requires consideration, the Commonwealth might, in a proper case,
reasonably contend that the purchase at retail on or after March 7, 1956, by one who donated
the property to the actual user satisfies this requirement. If this were not so, then the transfer of
property in a bona fide gift transaction might exempt such property from tax although otherwise,
upon being used in the Commonwealth, such property would be subject to tax. A liberal hus-
band, contemplating a move to Pennsylvania, may find it advantageous, taxwise, to give his
automobile to his wife, son or daughter prior to it being brought into the Commonwealth.
1957.1
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from the definition of "sale at retail". In like manner, the use of property
acquired for resale is not subject to tax. The various so-called productive
exemptions " are incorporated into the act by excluding the transfer of prop-
erty to be used directly in the exempt productive operations from the defini-
tion of "sale at retail" and the use of such property in these productive opera-
tions from the definition of "use". The third criterion prerequisite to a trans-
action being subject to tax is that such transaction is not included within one
of the specific exclusions from tax provided for by Section 203 of the act.
For instance, subsection (g) of section 203 specifically excludes from tax
"The sale at retail or use of motion picture film rented or licensed from a
distributor for the purpose of commercial exhibition". The "credit against
tax" provision of Section 205 may, as a practical matter, also provide an ex-
emption where tax has previously been paid to another state 30 with respect
to the specific property involved. It is not the purpose of this article to ex-
amine these various exemption provisions in any further detail except in so
far as they relate to the categorical definition of tangible personal property
and the interpretation thereof.
III.
APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Principles of statutory interpretation need be considered, of course, only
where a statute is confused, unclear or ambiguous. Where statutory language
is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is
no occasion to resorting to rules of statutory construction and interpretation."1
Unfortunately, the categorical definition of tangible personal property is any-
thing but clear and unambiguous. For this reason, most every problem of
application of tax under the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act requires con-
stant consideration of almost every basic principle of statutory interpretation
and construction. More often than not, in navigating these muddy waters,
the significant problems involve the applicability of particular principles
rather than the manner of application thereof.
29The exemptions applicable to certain property used in manufacturing, agriculture, and
public utility activities, as incorporated into the § 2 (j) definition of "Sale at retail" and the §
2 (n) definition of "use", are referred to generally as the "productive exemptions."
a0 This relief provision is usually not applicable where a use tax was paid in another state
since § 205 requires that such other state must grant ". . . substantially similar tax relief by reason
of the payment of tax under this act", and use tax statutes do not generally have provisions for
reciprocal tax relief. There is also some question as to the applicability of this provision where
a credit against Pennsylvania sales tax (as distinguished from use tax) is sought since most other
states grant the credit only against use tax, and such relief is probably not substantially similar
to a credit against sales tax. Note also that § 205 is applicable only when the property was
originally purchased for use outside of Pennyslvania, and then only when the tax was paid to
another state, rather than a political subdivision or other governmental unit.3' Commonwealth v. Przychodski, 177 Pa. Super. 203, 110 A. 2d 737 (1955).
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1. Rules of Strict Construction
It has been stated to be a basic rule of statutory construction that where
the intent or meaning of a statute levying taxes is doubful, such statute is
to be construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the
taxpayer.3" This rule would, of course, be applicable only where there is no
contrary legislative intention expressed in the particular statute being inter-
preted or in an applicable general statutory construction act. In brief the
rule generally is that revenue laws should be strictly construed." This is
clearly the Pennsylvania law in so far as tax imposition, application or cov-
erage provisions are involved." The Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act
specifically so provides." The Statutory Construction Act also provides, as
did prior case law, 6 that tax exemption provisions should be strictly con-
strued. In this case strict construction would restrict the exemption, that is,
require an interpretation against the exemption and the taxpayer. Perhaps
within these two rules of statutory construction lies the motivation behind the
categorical feature of the Pennsylvania Sales Tax. By limiting the transac-
tions subject to tax by means of a selective imposition provision, 8 the archi-
tects of the original statute might have sought the application of the rule of
strict construction in the interest of the taxpayer. There is, as will be developed
later in this article, substantial question whether this purpose was actually
achieved.
These two rules of strict construction of imposition and exemption lead
to complications when applied to the structure of the Selective Sales and Use
32 Hasset v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303, 314 (1938); Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153 (1917);
Breitinger v. Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 512, 515, 70 A. 2d 640 (1950); see Commonwealth v. Allied
Building Credits, Inc., 385 Pa. 370, 377, 123 A. 2d 686 (1956), where the Court applied the
principal of strict construction in favor of the taxpayer to a procedural provision limiting tax
assessment.
33 Pennsylvania Company's Appeal, 337 Pa. 321, 323, 11 A. 2d 160 (1940); Curtis' Estate,
335 Pa. 414, 418, 6 A. 2d 283 (1939).
34Girard Trust Company's Case, 343 Pa. 434, 23 A. 2d 454 (1942); In re Appeal of Pitts-
burgh Terminal Coal Co., 83 Pa. Super. 535 (1924). But cf. Commonwealth v. Mack Brothers
Motor Car Company, 359 Pa. 636, 59 A. 2d 923 (1948). For an extreme application of the
principle of strict construction, see Lee v. Wood, 126 Fla. 104, 170 So. 433 (1936).
35 Section 58 of the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019,
46 P.S. 558 provides that "All provisions of a law of the classes herein enumerated shall be strictly
construed . . . . (3) provisions imposing taxes ... (5) provisions exempting persons and property
from taxation .. .".
36Commonwealth v. Densten Felt and Hair Co., 304 Pa. 536, 537, 156 At. 164 (1931);
Commonwealth v. Lowry-Rodgers Co., 279 Pa. 361, 366, 123 At. 855 (1924); Academy of Fine
Arts v. Philadelphia County, 22 Pa. 496 (1854); Saxe v. Board of Revision of Taxes, 107 Pa.
Super. 108, 163 At. 317 (1932).
.37 See note 35 supra.
38 There doesn't seem to be any real question that the effect of the categorical definition of
"tangible personal property" is to create a selective imposition provision, in as much as § 201
imposes tax upon transactions involving "tangible personal property". For an interesting explana-




Tax Act. It seems clear that where the question is simply whether particular
property is included within any category, doubts should be resolved in favor
of the taxpayer and a determination made that the property is not subject to
tax. " Sales Tax Regulation No. TR-237(b), providing that caskets are not
subject to tax,"0 is one of the few simple determinations of this sort that have
been made under the act. Caskets, as such, are not listed in any of the cate-
gories. Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a mercantile license case, 1
has held that an undertaker is a vendor of caskets, the sale of the caskets to
the undertaker must be considered exempt as a sale for resale. Were this not
the case, there might be some validity to a contention that the caskets were
a commercial supply to the undertaker. But, difficulties arise with respect to
articles, such as "direct mail advertising literature", " "religious articles", "
and "food and beverages . . . purchased at or from a school, church or hos-
pital in the ordinary course of the activities of such organizations", " which
are included within the limitations or exclusions applicable to particular cate-
gories. A different rule of strict construction would be applicable if these
articles were considered not subject to tax by reason of being exclusions rather
than outside of the tax orbit by reason of not being within the scope of the
act. The question often arises whether particular on-premises sales of food
and beverages are considered to be within the ordinary course of the activities
of a school, church or hospital and, therefore, considered transactions involv-
ing "tangible personal property" under category seventeen. For instance, is
the sale of food in a hospital luncheonette open to all persons, a sale in the
ordinary course of a hospital's activities? If it is, the hospital need not collect
tax. Otherwise it must. The. institution may claim that the provision re-
garding transactions in the ordinary course of hospital activities is not an
exemption but rather is a limit upon the category and should be liberally con-
39 Note that in the text it was stated that "the property is not subject to tax", rather than
that the property is "exempt" from tax. A failure to include is involved rather than an actual ex-
emption.
40 The regulation is technically inarticulate in stating that the sale and use of caskets is
exempt. See note 39 supra.41 Commonwealth v. Dinnien, 320 Pa. 257, 182 At. 542 (1936). See also Auman, Inc. v.
City of Reading, 73 Pa. D. & C. 416 (1949); Jordan Undertaking Co. v. State, 235 Ala. 516,
180 So. 99 (1938).
42 Category 10. Pennsylvania legislation passes through the Legislature in unpunctuated
form, the official print being later punctuated by the Secretary of State. Cf. Act of April 9, 1929,
P.L. 177, § 804 (b), 71 P.S. 274 (b); Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, § 23, as amended, 46
P.S. 523. For this reason, § 53 of the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937,
P.L. 1019, 46 P.S. 553 provides that statutory punctuation is not to be considered in interpreting
a statute. A few unofficial reprints of the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act have placed a period
in front of the word "Bible" in Category ten. Perhaps this is because the word "Bible" was
capitalized as it always is regardless of position in a sentence. This interpretation with a period
instead of a comma must be erroneous as there would be no reason to specifically itemize Bibles as
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strued. The Department of Revenue, on the other hand, may take the position
that what is involved is an exemption subject to a strict interpretation in favor
of the Commonwealth. Academically, one may question whether the same
rule of interpretation is applicable to those limiting or exempting provisions
within the categories introduced by the word "except" and those introduced
by the phrase "but not including". It is doubtful though, that a court would
conclude that the Legislature was so articulate in drafting this act as to ex-
press an intention, for instance, that the restriction in category six, regarding
prescription drugs, be considered an exemption, since it is introduced by the
word "except", while the restriction on religious articles in category nine is
to be considered a limitation of scope since it is introduced by the phrase "but
not including". There are a great many ambiguities inherent in these cate-
gorical restrictions. A determination as to taxability of many items may well
depend upon which rule of strict construction is applicable. An analysis of
the Departmental rulings and regulations leads one to conclude that the De-
partment has universally considered these categorical restrictions to be ex-
emptions and thus has resolved the various ambiguities against the taxpayer
probably on the premise that any other rationale leads to subtlety of reasoning
not warranted by the statute.
2. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius-Ejusdem Generis
In interpreting the provisions of the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act, an
important preliminary issue that the courts will have to resolve is the per-
tinence of the related maxims, expressio unius est exclusio alterius and ejusdem
generis, to the various provisions of the act, particularly the categorical defi-
nition of tangible personal property. The first maxim, that express mention
excludes that which is omitted, has on occasion been applied by Pennsylvania's
appellate courts. 5 This maxim is not one of universal application and is gen-
erally not considered to be conclusive.4" It is at best merely an auxiliary rule
often, when properly applied where there is uncertainty as to the correct mean-
ing of words, a useful guide to actual legislative intent. 7 It is particularly
inapplicable where it appears that matter is expressly mentioned merely be-
cause of caution,48 or where, ". . . the supposed specific words are sufficiently
45 Irish v. Rosenbaum Company of Pittsburgh, 348 Pa. 194, 199, 34 A. 2d 486, 488 (1943);
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Kirk, 344 Pa. 455, 457, 25 A. 2d 825, 827 (1942); Commonwealth ex rel.,
Maurer v. Witkin et al., 344 Pa. 191, 25 A. 2d 317 (1942); Lemoyne Borough Annexation Case,
176 Pa. Super 38, 50, 107 A. 149 (1954); Dixon's Case, 138 Pa. Super. 385, 390, 11 A. 2d 169
(1939).
46 United States v. Barnes, 222 U. S. 513, 519 (1912); Fazio v. Pittsburgh Railways Com-
pany, 321 Pa. 7, 11, 182 Atl. 696 (1936); Crancer v. Lowden, 121 F. 2d 645, affirmed 315
U. S. 631 (1941); Commonwealth v. Kramer, 146 Pa. Super. 91, 103, 22 A. 2d 46, 52 (1941).
47 Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 128 (1936). See generally SUTHERLAND STATU.
TORY CONSTRUCTION (Horack, 3rd Ed.) Vol. 2, Par. 4915.
48 United States v, Katz, 78 F. Supp. 21 (M. D. Pa. 1948).
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comprehensive to exhaust the genus and leave nothing essentially similar upon
which the general words may operate". " The rationale behind ejusdem
generis is an attempt to reconcile an apparent incompatibility between specific
and general words, in view of the rules of construction that all words in a
statute are to be given effect, if possible; that parts of a statute are to be con-
sidered together; and that the Legislature is presumed not to have used super-
fluous words.50
There are a number of variations in the application of the second maxim,
ejusdem generis. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has often depended on
this principle in applying the rule that where the same statute contains spe-
cific provisions relating to. a particular subject such provisions must govern,
even though there are also general provisions in other parts of the statute,
which, if they stood alone would be broad enough to include that subject."
This principle is probably most often applied where general words are found
in the same statutory enumeration as specific words.2 Section 33 of the Penn-
sylvania Statutory Construction Act " provides that "General words shall be
construed to take their meaning from and be restricted by preceding particular
words". The Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas once defined the prin-
ciple of ejusdem generis, within this context, as meaning that ". . . general and
specific words capable of analogous meaning take color from each other, so
that the general words may be restricted to a sense analogous to those less
general . . ."." This rule does not, of course, override all other rules of con-
struction, and must never be applied to defeat the real purpose of a statute.
It is not a device for confining the operation of a statute within narrower
49 Mason v. United States, 260 U. S. 545, 554 (1923); in Knoxtenn Theatres, Inc., v. Mc-
Canless, 177 Tenn. 497, 151 S. W. 2d 164 (1941), a tax was imposed upon the use of liquid
carbonic acid gas or substitutes therefor, "used in the preparation and/or mixing and/or sale
of soft drinks or other beverages, or for any other purpose .... ." It was argued that gas used
as a refrigerant was not subject to the tax since under the principle of ejusdem generis the general
designation, "or for any other purpose," must refer only to other uses like that specially desig-
nated. The court rejected this position on several grounds, one of which was that the words,
"soft drinks or other beverages," exhaust the kind or class, and therefore the general words
following "or for any other purpose," by necessity, show an intent to go beyond the field of soft
irinks and beverages.
" SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, (Horack 3rd Ed.) Vol. 2, p. 398, Sec. 4909.
51 Appeal of Davis, 314 Pa. 357, 172 At. 399 (1934); Cf. Commonwealth v. Lehigh and
New England Railroad Co., 286 Pa. 271, 110 Atl. 725 (1920), affirming per curiam an opinion
below, 47 Pa. C. C. 388, 22 Dauph. 91.
52 "Thus, where the words employed in a statute were 'tradesman, workman, laborer or other
person whatsoever,' it was held they did not include a farmer; Rex v. The Inhabitants of Whit-
nash, 7 Barn. & Cress., 596; nor the drivers and proprietors of stage coaches; Sandiman v. Breach,
7 Barn. & Cress., 96, as these were not ejusdem generis." Bradon for use of Dull v. Davis, 2 Legal
Record Reports 142, 143 (Pa. 1883). Cf. Jones' Case, 341 Pa. 329, 19 A. 2d 280 (1941);
Morris v. Coal Mining Co. of Graceton, 164 Pa. Super. 220, 227, 63 A. 2d 449, 451 (1949) and
cases cited therein; Philadelphia v. Goldfine, 151 Pa. Super. 59, 63, 29 A. 2d 233, 235 (1942);
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm., 119 Pa. Super. 292, 181 Atd. 73 (1935).
53 Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, 46 P.S. 533.
5,4 As quoted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Klucher, 326 Pa.
587, 589, 193 At. 28 (1937).
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limits than actually intended by the Legislature. "  For instance, in Common-
wealth v. Klucher,56 the question before the Court was whether a "pin ball
machine" was subject to tax under a statute taxing every "... shooting-gallery,
shuffle-board, billiard or pool-table, or bowling alley, nine or ten pin or other
alley, or other game played with the use of balls or pins, or other objects "
The Dauphin County Court applied ejusdem generis in determining that pin
ball machines were not subject to tax under the statute since they were a "far
cry" from bowling alleys or nine or ten pin alleys. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in reversing on appeal was of the opinion that the words "other objects"
as used in the tax statute should not be given a narrow interpretation in defer-
ence to the ejusdem generis rule. The Court thought that the Legislature in
using the words "or other objects" intended to give the taxing statute wide
application."
Two United States Supreme Court cases aptly point up the restraint a
court must display in applying the principle of ejusdem generis. In Gooch v.
United States, 8 the defendant had, for the purpose of avoiding arrest, kid-
napped two police officers and transported them across a state line. He had
been convicted of a Federal offense which consisted of transporting across state
lines, a kidnapped person ". . . held for ransom or reward or otherwise".
The Court rejected the defense contention that ejusdem generis was applicable
and that the general phrase "or otherwise" must be limited to some kind of
monetary reward. Such an interpretation, the Court held, would defeat the
obvious purpose of the legislation. United States v. Alpers," involved a con-
viction for violating a statute prohibiting the interstate shipment of ". . . any
obscene, lewd, or lascivious, or any filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-
picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent char-
acter. . . ." The Court refused to limit the term "other matter of indecent
character" to objects comprehensible by sight only, and upheld the conviction
under the statute of one who shipped obscene phonographic records in inter-
state commerce. The Court stated that the statute was comprehensive and
should.not be constricted by a mechanical rule of construction.
3. Rules Against Interpretations Implying Duplicity of Expression
or Surplusage of Language
Courts have often stated that a construction of a statute that relegates
some words to a position of surplusage is not permissible, unless no other con-
55 Commonwealth v. Klucher, 326 Pa. 587, 590, 193 Atl. 28 (1937); In re Frederick's Es-
tate, 333 Pa. 327, 5 A. 2d 91 (1939); Girard Trust Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 369 Pa. 499,
87 A. 2d 277 (1952).
56326 Pa. 587, 193 At. 28 (1937).
'17 Cf. Commonwealth v. Saitz, 35 Pp. 526, 6 A, 2d 819 (1939).
5 297 U. S. 124 (1936).
89 338 U. S. 680 (1950),
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struction is reasonably possible.60  This principle is probably derived from
the doctrine codified in Section 51 of the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction
Act 1 that "every law shall be construed if possible to give effect to all its
provisions".2 Although the more common application of the principle that
words should not be relegated to surplusage has been to avoid statutory pro-
visions being considered to be without meaning, on occasion the principle has
been applied as a rule against duplicity of expression. On this basis, courts
have on occasion given different interpretations to two similar provisions of
a statute in order to avoid a construction that would result in one provision
being considered surplus.6"
In applying these principles, it is often quite important to study the
legislative developments of particular statutory language in order to determine
whether apparently redundant language was inserted into the statute either
out of an abundance of caution or for the purpose of expressing differentiable
concepts. Under the former circumstance neither maxim is applicable. For
instance, in an Alabama case,"' that state's Supreme Court was called upon to
interpret a provision of its sales tax act " exempting ". . . the sale of news-
papers and agricultural or religious publications and magazines or . . .. the
sale of advertising space in said newspapers or publications". The question
before the court was whether the exemption of magazines referred to all
magazines or only to agricultural or religious magazines. The Court looked
at the historical legislative development of the exemption provision and noted
that when the bill was reported by committee the provision read ". . . news-
papers and agricultural and religious publications . . ." In the House the
words "and magazines" were added after "religious publications". The Court
observed that since publications include magazines the House amendment was
unnecessary unless it was read to expand the exemption. Since there was no
60 Allentown v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm., 173 Pa. Super. 219, 222, 96 A. 2d 157
(1953); Commonwealth v. Daly, 147 Pa. Super. 545, 551, 24 A. 2d 91, (1942.); Lemoyne Bor-
ough Annexation Case, 176 Pa. Super. 38, 51, 107 A. 2d 149 (1954); Commonwealth v. Mack
Bros. Motor Car Co., 359 Pa. 636, 640, 59 A. 2d 923 (1948).
61 Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, 851, 46 P.S. 551.
62Commonwealth v. Hubbs (No. 1), 137 Pa. Super. 229, 239, 8 A. 2d 611 (1939).
6a Commonwealth v. Stingel, 156 Pa. Super. 359, 361, 40 A. 2d 140 (1944); Lemoyne
Borough Annexation Case, 176 Pa. Super. 38, 51, 107 A. 2d 149 (1954); West v. Lysle, 302
Pa. 147, 152, 153 At. 131 (1931). In Southwestern Gas and Electric Co. v. State, 190 S.W. 2d
132, 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), aff'd, 145 Tex. 24, 193 S.W. 2d 675 (1946), the court refused
to assume that the legislature did not use unnecessary verbiage. Here, the imposition provision
of the statute being considered assessed a tax upon chain stores selling "equipment or appliances",
while the relevant exclusion provision exempted certain stores operated by utility companies and
selling "appliances". The court held that property considered under the act to be electrical equip-
merit is also properly classified as in appliance and that the legislature did not intend to dis-
tinquish between the two terms. It thus considered the term "equipment", in the imposition pro-
vision, surplusage.
14 Long v. Poulos, 234 Ala. 149, 174 So. 230 (1937).
15 Alabama Sale, Tgx Revenue Act of February 1937 (Acts 1936-1937) (Ex. Sess] p. 125,
4 (i).
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ambiguity in the bill prior to the House amendment, the Court reasoned that
that amendment must have been intended to add something rather than to
clarify. It concluded that the only intention could have been to add to the
exemption all magazines in addition to those that were included within the
term "agricultural and religious publications".
It is important to observe that these principles of statutory construction
and interpretation must be used with discretion and only where they are an
aid to a determination of actual legislative intent. In interpreting the Selective
Sales and Use Tax Act one must be careful to avoid mechanical application
of these principles. Otherwise, the result might well be an exaggeration of
the inequities already existent in the Act and possibly even an actual perversion
of legislative intent with a resultant economically undesirable shift of tax
incidence.
IV.
PROBLEMS OF INTRACATEGORICAL AND OF INTERCATEGORICAL INTERPRETATION
As a matter of convenience, problems pertaining to the categorical defi-
nition of "tangible personal property" may be divided into two classes. The
first class consists of problems involving an interpretation of the provisions
of an individual category where there is no need to consider the relationship
of the particular category under consideration to any other category. We may
designate these problems as ones involving intracategorical interpretation.
Most problems arising under the act are of the second class that necessitate
attention being paid not only to the language of a particular category but also
to the language of one or more other categories and the interrelationships of
the various categories. This class involves what we may term problems of
intercategorical interpretation. Both the problems of intracategorical inter-
pretation and of intercategorical interpretation do, of course, often necessitate
reference to provisions of the act extraneous to the section 2 (1) definition
of "tangible personal property".
A consideration of general principles of intracategorical interpretation is
a convenient first step to developing an overall interpretative approach to the
categorical features of the Selective Sales and Use Tax Act. Another approach
would be to first develop basic principles regarding the interrelationship of the
categories in order to understand the significance of a determination that a
specific item of property is included within a particular category. The first
approach has been chosen for present purposes although, in the solution of
actual problems, it is probably most expeditious to consider intracategorical
,and ipferctegorical problems simultaneously.
1957.)
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
1. Problems of Intracategorical Interpretation
In considering problems of intracategorical interpretation we are con-
cerned only with the question of whether a specific item of personal property
is included within a particular individual category. In arriving at such de-
terminations, we shall not consider the provisions of any category other than
the particular one under consideration.
Previous general consideration has been given to certain of the principles
of statutory construction and interpretation which are important tools in the
solution of problems of. intracategorical interpretation. These include the
principles of strict interpretation of inclusionary and exclusionary provisions,
the maxims expressio unius est exclusio alterius and ejusdern generis, and the
rules relevant to apparently surplus verbiage.
A somewhat typical problem involving the maxims is whether the term
"sprays" in category twelve includes anti-mosquito chemicals or only sprays
ejusdem generis with the other items enumerated in the category. A more
important question is whether home appliance repair parts are included within
category four. This latter category does not specifically include the term
"parts" although this term is used elsewhere in categories one, five, eleven and
sixteen. Considering the history and purpose of the act this was clearly a
legislative oversight. At only one point in the act did the Legislature appear
to intentionally exempt a part or component and, at the same time, tax the
unit in conjunction with which the part is used. This point is the Section
203 (e) exclusion for tubes and replacement parts directly used in broad-
casting radio and television programs by licensed stations. The rationale be-
hind this latter exclusion for broadcasting tubes and parts is apparently that
competing mediums of entertainment, advertisement, and information dis-
semination are afforded tax relief in that certain of their operations are con-
sidered to be manufacturing and they are, therefore, entitled to the productive
exemptions provided for in the definitions of "sale at retail" and "use". " In
both the case of the productive exemptions and the broadcasting exclusion,
only a limited tax relief is afforded for certain property used directly in the
function involved. The application of tax under the act does follow a rela-
tively rational although confused pat*tern, and the failure to include home
appliance repair parts within the definition of "tangible personal property"
would not be consistent with this pattern. Nevertheless, a legislative over-
sight might well result in an item not being subject to tax regardless of the
subjective intent of the legislators. But it is probable that home appliance
repair parts are considered to be "tangible personal property" under the act
r6 See note 29 supra.
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since the term "fittings" in category four might well include most, if not all,
replacement parts.
The principle that a limiting clause or phrase following more than one
expression to which it might be applicable should generally be restricted to
the last antecedent 17 is relevant to certain problems of intracategorical inter-
pretations. For instance, is fuel oil for other than heating purposes included
within category thirteen? The problem of whether, even if not included
within this category, such fuel oil is considered under the act to be tangible
personal property will be dealt with when we later take up the problems of
intercategorical interpretation.68 Substantial quantities of fuel oil used to
propel ocean going vessels are sold in Pennsylvania port areas. The basic act,
as amended on May 24, 1956, did not specifically exempt such sales. As a
matter of taxation policy, competition between adjacent marketing areas makes
unilateral taxation of these sales impractical. The application of a tax by
Pennsylvania on port deliveries of fuel would divert a substantial portion of
such business to nearby out-of-state ports where such a tax is not imposed.
For this reason, most jurisdictions in areas where there are competing sources
of ships' stores and supplies do not impose a sales tax on such property. "6
The amendment of April 4, 1957,7" recognized this problem and specifically
exempted from tax the sale or use of tangible personal property to be used
or consumed as fuel, supplies, ship's equipment, ships' stores or sea stores on
vessels to be operated principally outside the limits of the Commonwealth.
This amendment affects only transactions occurring on or after its effective
date and, as a result, it is still an important question whether sales of ships'
fuel between March 7, 1956, and April 4, 1957, were subject to tax. In
examining this problem it must first be determined whether such fuel is in-
cluded within category thirteen. If it is not, then a further problem is whether
such fuel is nevertheless included within the definition of "tangible personal
property" by reason of one of the other less specific categories. Category
thirteen includes "fuel oil and petroleum products for heating purposes steam
and natural manufactured and bottled gas". This quotation from the act is
here unpunctuated because all Pennsylvania legislation is adopted in unpunctu-
ated form and, under the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act, punctuation
67 United States v. Hughes, 116 F.2d 613 (3rd Cir. 1940); Commonwealth v. Brady, 35 Pa.
D. & C. 184 (1939); 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4921 (Horack 3rd ed.).
But cf. Fisher v. Connard, 100 Pa. 63 (1882); Kuntz v. Alliance Sand Company, 156 Pa.
Super. 563, 40 A. 2d 864 (1945); Morris v. Glen Alden Coal Company, 136 Pa. Super. 132,
7 A. 2d 126 (1939).
This rule is quite weak and the slightest indication of a contrary intent will usually be suf-
ficient to extend the application of the relative term.
68 See text at note 87 infra.
o1 See N. Y. CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § N 41-2.0 (c).
70 Act No. 24, P.L. 34,
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cannot be considered as an aid in determining legislative intent." Does the
term "for heating purposes" modify only "petroleum products" or does it also
modify "fuel oil"?
If the heating purpose limitation was meant to modify the term "fuel
oil", then actually this term would be unnecessary surplusage since all fuel
oils are petroleum products. The arguments that the Legislature here used
duplicitious language either for reasons of caution or because of failure to
notice a shift of terms are obviously without merit. The Pennsylvania De-
partment of Revenue has concluded that "for heating purposes" does not
modify "fuel oil".72 The amendment of April 4, 1957, exempting tangible
personal property used or consumed as fuel on certain vessels may be of aid
in solving this problem since, if the Legislature did not consider such fuel oil
to be tangible personal property, it should have used the general term "prop-
erty" rather than the term "tangible personal property" in setting forth the
exemption in the amendment of April 4, 1957.
The general non-specific nature of certain categories has previously been
noted. Category five, as an example, includes "business, industrial, profes-
sional and commercial supplies, equipment and machines of all types, includ-
ing parts and accessories purchased for or used in connection therewith". A
critical issue relevant to a systematic interpretation of the act is how broad
a scope should be given to such general terms as "commercial supply". An
analysis of the various regulations and rulings issued by the Pennsylvania
Department of Revenue leads to the conclusion that the Department generally
considers every item of personal property purchased by a commercial organi-
zation to be a commercial supply to such organization, unless such property
either has an extended useful life, in which case it is considered to be "com-
mercial equipment",78 or is incorporated into a product or real estate, in which
case it is considered to be "material". 4 All consumables " purchased by com-
71 See Kuntz v. Alliance Sand Company, 156 Pa. Super. 563 (1944). See also note 42 supra.
72 See Selective Sales and Use Tax Legal Ruling No. 143, issued by the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Revenue.
7. The department does not consider the term "supplies" to include replacement parts. This
distinction is particularly significant with respect to the § 203(c) exclusion of "supplies and ma-
terials" to be used in the fulfillment of fixed price construction contracts entered into prior to
March 7, 1956. Significantly the original Act of March 6, 1956 provided an exemption for
"tangible personal property" used in the fulfillment of such contracts and the amending act of
May 24, 1956 replaced the broad term with the narrower one "supplies and materials". See
Selective Sales and Use Tax Regulation TRa 204(d) which provides that the exemption is not
applicable to construction equipment or parts and accessories therefore. Note that the § 203(e)
exclusion for certain property used directly in broadcasting is limited to "tubes and replacement
parts".
74The act uses the term "material" in § 203(c). See note 73 supra. Personal property re-
ferred to in § 2(h) (2) which is incorporated as an "ingredient or constituent" into other per-
sonal property is also generically "material". As a result such "material" probably does not
come within the property to which the productive exemptions are applicable. See note 29 supra.
5 The test used by the regulations of the Department of Revenue under the Consumers Sales
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mercial organizations are, therefore, considered to be commercial supplies.
The Department regards such items as bottled water,'7 ice, " linens, towels,
industrial wipers, 7  and rubber gloves 71 when purchased by commercial or-
ganizations to be "commercial supplies". The Department also appears to
be of the opinion that the four terms "business", "industrial", "professional"
and "commercial", as used in categories four and five, overlap in many cases.
For the sake of simplicity, therefore, we shall use the term "commercial" in a
sense that includes the other three terms on the premise that all four terms
were included in the statute to avoid contentions that the term "commercial"
was used in a restricted sense.8"
An analysis of the legislative history of the Selective Sales and Use Tax
Act lends a great deal of weight to the validity of the broad meaning the
Department has ascribed to such general terms as "commercial supplies" used
in the categorical definition of tangible personal property. It was through
the insertion of these obviously broad terms that the Legislature sought to
convert what was an excise tax of limited application into a general sales and
use tax.8 If these general terms had initially appeared in the bill as intro-
duced and then the Legislature had added the terms of limited application,
it might have been validly argued that the legislative intent was to limit the
application of tax by characterizing the general terms with specifics. But this
was not the case. It is also perhaps significant that simultaneously with the
addition of the general terms to the definition of "tangible personal property",
the Legislature added quite a number of Section 203 specific exclusions. Often,
particular exclusions in Section 203 have meaning only when a broad sig-
nificance is given to general terms used in the definition of "tangible personal
property". For instance, the Section 203 (f) exemption for gasoline is, of
Tax Act, see note 3 supra., was whether the property was capitalized or expended for Federal
Income Tax purposes. Although from an accounting point of view this test results in simplicity
of application, there is substantial question as to whether it does not confuse the issue. The
question in many cases is whether or not tax is due, while the federal test only determines when
a deduction shall be allowed. With respect to items having intermediate useful lives, the sim-
plicity in the administration of the federal tax resulting from considering such property to be con-
sumed, and thus expended probably outweighs the slight shift of tax liability into future periods.
These considerations are not here relevant.
76 Pa. Dept. of Revenue Selective Sales and Use Tax Legal Unit Ruling No. 151.
7 Pa. Dept. of Revenue Selective Sales and Use Tax Legal Unit Rulings, Nos. 10a and 30.
78 See Table 102-A of Pa. Dept. of Revenue Selective Sales and Use Tax Regulation No. TRa.
102.
7 Pa. Dept. of Revenue Selective Sales and Use Tax Legal Unit Ruling No. 37.
80But cf. State v. Kansas City Power and Light Co., 342 Mo. 75, 111 S.W.2d 513 (1938),
where the sales tax act imposed tax upon, "sales of electricity or electrical current, water, sewer
service, gas (natural and artificial), to domestic, commercial or industrial consumers". The court
held that sales of the enumerated items to transportation companies and municipalities were not
subject to tax. It reasoned that the term "commercial" was used in a limited sense since otherwise
the term "industrial" would not have been used in a duplicitious sense.
81 See text at note 6 supra.
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course, of significance only if gasoline is considered to be "tangible personal
property" under the act. The possible categories which would include gaso-
line are categories one (supply used in operation of motor vehicles), three
(supply used in construction or maintenance of real estate), four (commercial
supply), and five (commercial supply). Similarly, the Section 203 (g) ex-
emption for certain motion picture film rentals implies that motion picture
film is either considered to be a "commercial supply" under categories three
or four, or else is a projection supply under category eleven.
The various exemptions set forth in Section 203 (i), added by the amend-
ing act of April 4, 1957, also imply a broad legislative interpretation of the
general terms used in the categorical definition of "tangible personal prop-
erty". The Section 203 (m) exemption for coal as added by the amending
act of May 9, 1957, is particularly significant in its strong implication that,
prior to this amendment, coal was subject to tax as a home, industrial, pro-
fessional, business or commercial supply.8"
Clause (4) of the Section 2 (f) definition of "purchase price" is another
aid in determining how broad an interpretation the Legislature intended for
the term "commercial supply" and its kindred terms. This clause deals with
the determination of a tax base with respect to certain rental transactions.
By its terms this clause is applicable to transactions involving a "transfer or
retention of possession or custody whether it be termed a rental, lease, service
or otherwise, of tangible personal property, including but not limited to linens,
aprons, motor vehicles, trailers, tires, industrial office and construction equip-
ment and business machines . . .". Although the provisions of this clause,
in so far as they set forth a tax base applicable to rental transactions, are not
relevant to our present discussion, the clause is of substantial significance for
present purposes in so far as it contains a list of certain property which the
Legislature considered to be "tangible personal property" when it approved
the amended act of May 24, 1956, which readopted in fortified form the
categorical definition of "tangible personal property". This clause is surely
a legislative acknowledgement that by reason of some other provision of the
act linens and aprons are "tangible personal property". Linens and aprons
could only be considered "tangible personal property" under Section 2 (1) if
they are included within the term "supplies" as used in categories four and
five.
82 A change of statutory language is generally considered to indicate a change of legislative
intent. For instance in Dixon's case, 138 Pa. Super. 385, 11 A. 2d 169 (1940), where the
original statute did not expressly impose the personal intangible property tax upon equitable in-
terests, the Court considered the addition of such interests by the amending act a clear implication
that they were not subject to tax prior to the amendment.
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2. Problems of Intercategorical Interpretation
Once an initial or tentative determination has been arrived at that the
property under consideration is possibly included within one or more particu-
lar categories, it is necessary to consider whether such determination is af-
fected by the interrelationship of such category or categories and other cate-
gories within the definition of "tangible personal property". This further
intercategorical analysis is unnecessary after a determination has been made
that the property being considered is not included within any category, since
intercategorical analysis, if it has any significance at all, can only limit rather
than broaden the scope of a particular category.
The basic problem of intercategorical interpretation is whether a par-
ticular article of property comprehended within one of the more general cate-
gories is considered under the act to be "tangible personal property", notwith-
standing that such article is not included within a more specific category which
includes other similar articles. For example, is firewood, by reason of being
a home supply under category four, considered to be "tangible personal prop-
erty" for the purposes of the act although it is not included within category
thirteen? This latter category includes property which could generally be
characterized as being fuels or more properly, since "steam" is included in the
category, "heat producing substances". The maxims expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius and ejusdem generis which have previously been discussed "
are, of course, relevant to this problem. The reasoning of the latter maxim
has been considered applicable by the Arkansas Supreme Court in a somewhat
analogous situation " where one section of a sales tax act imposed upon "all
sales of tangible personal property", " while another section taxed "all retail
sales of electric power and light, natural gas, water, telephone use and mes-
sages and telegrams"." The Arkansas court held that under the statute arti-
•ficial gas was not subject to tax. It reasoned that where in the same statute
there is a particular and a general enactment, and the latter includes that
which is also embraced within the former, only the particular enactment is
effective within its area, while the general enactment affects only that which
within its general language is not within the provisions of the particular en-
actment.
Difficulties arise in attempting to apply this principle to the Selective
Sales and Use Tax Act's categorical definition of "tangible personal prop-
erty". First, it is not clear how specific a category must be in order to be
83 See text at notes 45 through 57 supra.
84Wiseman v. Arkansas Utilities Co., 191 Ark. 854, 88 S.W.2d 81 (1935).
85 Arkansas Sales Tax Act of 1935, § 4(a).
86 Arkansas Sales Tax Act of 1935, § 4(d).
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considered a particularization of all property of a certain character that is
subject to tax. Although many of the section 2 (1) categories are obviously
narrow while others are patently broad, certain of the categories do shade
together. An article may be comprehended within each of the two broadest
categories (four and five) and also within a number of the more particular
categories. For instance, a bolt would be included not only within categories
four and five but also possibly within categories one, three, eleven, fourteen
and sixteen. A category which may be considered particular with respect to
one article is possibly general with respect to certain other articles. As an
example, category fourteen is generally more specific than category three. But
with respect to an item such as a bolt, which may always be considered to be
"hardware", category fourteen is more inclusive than category three, which
would only include bolts used in conjunction with real estate. Another prob-
len is how inclusive must a category be in order that it be assumed that the
Legislature intended that only the items of the general class that are included
in the category shall be subject to tax, even though such items may be em-
braced within a more general category. More general, that is, with respect
to the item involved. Category thirteen is a good example of this point.
First of all, like most of the other categories, this one is not pure in the sense
that all the items included therein are comprehended within a general com-
mercial category that has an independent significance other than for the pur-
poses of this act. Even though each of the items in category thirteen is com-
monly used as a source of heat, one does have other uses. Included within
the term "fuel oil", as used in this category, is probably also fuel oil used for
propulsion purposes." A great many substances, such as coal, coke, peat,
kindling wood, compressed carbon products and artificial fuels, which are
commonly the source of heat, are not included within this category. To this
list might also possibly be added liquified petroleum products that are nor-
mally used in a vaporized state, since the term "bottled gas" might not be-
considered to cover these products.8"
A second argument against interpreting the specific categories as limiting
the general categories is the previously mentioned legislative history of the
act. The specific categories came first and the general were added in order
to convert a limited excise tax into a broad base general sales tax act."9
87 See text at note 68 supra.
88 In Lee v. Wood, 126 Fla. 104, 170 So. 433 (1936), where the statute imposed a tax
upon the sale of ". .. natural or manufactured gas for light, heat or power . . .", the court held
that tax was not due upon the sale of a bottled product called "Protane" in liquid state which,
under pressure, was easily converted into a gas, in which state, it was used as a fuel.
89 See text at note 6 supra.
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A third consideration involves other provisions of the act which in some
cases strongly imply, and in other cases actually declare, that certain items
which would be excluded from the definition of "tangible personal property"
by a rationale that specific categories limit general categories are, in fact, con-
sidered to be "tangible personal property" under the act.
It was previously pointed out " that section 2 (f) (4) treats aprons as
a form of "tangible personal property", yet they can only be such if they come
within categories four or five as a "commercial supply". It might be argued
that category two precludes aprons, a form of wearing apparel, from being
considered tangible personal property on the premise that wearing apparel
is subject to tax only if included in category two. This reasoning does not
consider that within certain of the other categories there is evidence that it
was not intended that category two should be the exclusive wearing apparel
category. For instance, the Legislature felt it necessary in category eight,
which includes "leather goods and related articles", to exclude from the cate-
gory ". . leather wearing apparel not elsewhere in this section defined as
tangible personal property . . .". If the Legislature meant that the only wear-
ing apparel subject to tax was that set forth in category two, it could have
clearly limited the category eight exception to "leather wearing apparel de-
fined in clause two as tangible personal property". By not doing so, might
not the Legislature have considered that there are many categories under
which leather wearing apparel may be subject to tax. The amendment of
April 4, 1957, to category eleven, which refers to sporting goods and athletic
equipment normally not used or worn except when engaged in a particular
sport, clearly indicates that the Legislature considered that sporting apparel
is "tangible personal property" by reason of being either "sporting goods" or
"athletic equipment". This would not be so if category two were the only
articulation of wearing apparel considered to be tangible personal property.
Another reference to certain of the Section 203 exclusions is of aid in
attempting to solve this problem of whether the specific categories limit the
general categories. If category thirteen includes all the fuels subject to tax,
then why is gasoline specifically excluded from tax by subsection (f) ? The
same holds true for the exemption for coal added by the amendment of
May 9, 1957."' If the exclusion of drugs and medical supplies sold on pre-
scription from category six precluded such items from being considered a
"professional supply" to a physician, why did the Legislature specifically ex-
90 See text following note 82 supra.
91 Section 203 (m) added by Act No. 51, P.L. 114. See text at note 82 suprt.
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clude such transactions from tax in clause (1) added by the April 4, 1957,
amendment?
The use, eccentrically throughout the categories, of broad adjectives and
adjectival phrases, such as "all",. "of all types","3 and "for indoor or outdoor
purposes"," seems to strengthen the conclusion that the Legislature, in cov-
ering the same item in both the general and the specific categories, was doing
so, not with the intention of limiting the general by the specific, but rather
in order to insure that all general items of commerce were somehow consid-
ered under the act to be "tangible personal property" except for food sold
for off-premises consumption, clothing purchased for personal use and a few
specific items, such as caskets, " which it was desired to indirectly exempt.
An interesting question subsidiary to this main issue, but which may
eventually turn out to involve the only problems of intercategorical inter-
pretation recognized by the courts as having any significance, is whether there
is a distinction between an item being specifically excluded from a category or
merely not being included in a particular statutory enumeration. For instance,
mail order catalogues and direct mail advertising literature are specifically
excluded from category ten. Clearly, if the sale or use of these items were
set forth as a specific exclusion from tax in Section 203, there would be no
question that transactions involving them were not subject to tax. A pre-
liminary issue to this specific problem is what the Legislature intended to in-
clude as books, stationery and stationery supplies. Probably a broad inter-
pretation was intended or, otherwise, there would be no reason to determine
that direct mail advertising literature came within this class at all. Possibly,
though, the Legislature intended that only such direct mail advertising lit-
erature as could be considered to be books was exempt from tax. If this be
so, then the new category eighteen added by the amendment of April 4, 1957,
would subject to tax all other direct mail advertising literature not considered
to be books. The problem is why the Legislature chose to place certain
limitations or exemptions within the categories and others in Section 203.
The only plausible answer is that it was not intended that the limitations and
exclusions within the categories should be general, but only that they should
limit the individual categories." If this be so, then the articulated exclusion
within a category should plausibly be no more significant than the failure of
a category to include an item.
02 Categories 1, 3 and 7.
93 Category 5.
9 ' Category 4.
95 See text at note 40 supra.
O9, Pa. Dept. of Revenue Selective Sales and Use Tax Legal Unit Ruling No. 54, provides
that the limitation within category nine only exempts from tax religious articles which are other-
wise included within the category.
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Possibly there is one limitation on this principle, and that is that where
an article is specifically excluded from a category, it should only be consid-
ered to be defined as tangible personal property by reason of its being included
within a general category where, consistent with such inclusion in a general
category, significance can be given to the limitation within the specific cate-
gory. This would be the case where all the property of the particular type
involved does not come within the general category. For instance, drugs
sold on prescription would, on this principle, not be considered tangible per-
sonal property by reason of the category six articulation. Nevertheless, the
sale of drugs to a private hospital, for purposes other than resale, would be
a transaction involving tangible personal property in the form of a commercial
supply under either category four or five. Such reasoning does not leave the
prescription drug limitation of category six without significance since sales of
drugs on prescription to private individuals would not be included in any
of the other categories and would, therefore, by reason of the category six
limitation, not be considered to be tangible personal property.
V.
CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania's major broad base revenue measure, the Selective Sales and
Use Tax Act, is expected to yield approximately 236 million dollars per year."7
Inevitably the economic well being of the Commonwealth, its commercial and
industrial community, and its citizens must, to a significant extent, be related
to the incidence of this tax. It is particularly important that the economic
effect of the tax upon current and projected activity within the Commonwealth
be readily ascertainable with reasonable certainty by industrial and mercantile
interests.
Under the Act a vendor is personally liable for tax he is required to but
fails to collect. This is probably true even though the failure results from
a mistake of law as to the taxability of a particular transaction or series of
transactions. As a result an erroneous determination by a vendor that trans-
actions of a particular nature are not subject to tax might well result in the
accruing of substantial vendor liability. With the passage of time the pos-
sibility of reimbursement from the purchaser who was primarily liable for
the tax becomes negligible, while the Commonwealth has over three years in
which to make assessments.9" Liability of this nature often results in vendors
9T See 18th Biennial Budget of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the fiscal biennium
June 1, 1957 to May 31, 1959-General Fund. (Harrisburg 1957), p. 7.
9s Section 560 as amended by the Act of July 8, 1957, Act No. 297, permits the Department
of Revenue to assess tax due under the act within three years after the date the periodic return
is filed or the end of the year in which the tax liability arises whichever shall last occur.
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following the safest course and demanding payment of tax in all doubtful
situations. Competitive considerations where other vendors are not collecting
tax on similar transactions often lead to' complications. A purchaser con-
fronted by what he believes to be an improper demand by a vendor that tax
be paid has only a limited number of remedies, all of which lead to incon-
veniences and none of which are wholly satisfactory. He may either purchase
elsewhere, pay the tax and petition the Commonwealth for a refund, or pay
the tax and suppress his irritation. Where the amount of tax is insubstantial,
more often than not the purchaser follows the latter course and pays a tax
he considers not due. Where the Commonwealth's position is not consistent
with that of the taxpayer, the refund procedure may entail rather extensive
accounting and legal expenses.
For these reasons it is essential that this sales and use tax act set forth
the incidence of tax clearly and unambigously. This the Pennsylvania Act
fails to do. The very nature of the tax is ill defined. Although structurally
it appears that a selective excise tax is imposed, as a practical matter we have
a general sales and use tax. Unfortunately, at the present time and probably
for at least one more year,99 no one can be certain how general or how se-
lective the law actually is. Tax is imposed only upon transactions involving
"tangible personal property" as defined by the act by reason of being included
within the ambiguous categorical definition. The major principles of statu-
tory interpretation fail to rationalize these categories. On the contrary, any
attempt to apply these principles generally creates insurmountable internal
inconsistencies and chaotic patterns of tax application. The courts must in-
evitably untangle the jumble. This will be a time consuming process since
the administrative review procedures, generally prerequisite to judicial action,
require approximately one year in a typical case.1"'
One may conclude that the categorical structure of the Pennsylvania stat-
ute is ill suited to a general sales and use tax measure. Possibly the original
concept of a selective excise tax had merit if the categories had been sharply
defined and basic principles of interpretation respecting the categories were
included in the act. The limitations and exclusions presently incorporated
within specific categories should either have been placed in the general ex-
99The application of tax may be judicially tested either by the reassessment procedures or
through the refund procedures. Except where by stipulation between the taxpayer and the De-
partment the disposal time is extended, it is the duty of the department to dispose of the issue
raised by a reassessment petition within six months (§ 542). A similar provision is applicable
to the department's disposition of refund petitions ( 553). In either case the taxpayer may
have the Board of Finance and Revenue review the Departmental action (§§ 543, 554). The
Board must act within six months. Either a taxpayer or the Commonwealth may appeal the
Board's determination to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County (§§ 544, 555).
10 See note 99 supra.
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clusive section or clearly made applicable only to exclude the specified prop-
erty from the particular category. Even with these changes the law could
probably not be considered a good broad base tax measure. There is no im-
mediately apparent reason why a broad base sales and use tax measure should
have a categorical structure unless all transactions for consumption involving
the enumerated property are to be subject to tax without regard to the identity
of the purchaser or the use to which the purchaser subjects the property.
The more exclusions and exemptions incorporated into an excise tax,
the greater the enforcement and administrative problems and expense. Cer-
tain exemptions do serve a genuine economic or social purpose. The desir-
ability of each such exemption should be weighed against the problems it
creates. There is no apparent economic or social basis for the categorical
feature of the Pennsylvania act in its present form. It is strongly recom-
mended that the next session of the Pennsylvania legislature do what this
session failed to do and follow Governor Leader's suggestion ... by writing a
rational broad base tax measure for the Commonwealth. If Pennsylvania is
to have a sales tax, the statute should be simple in both application and ad-
ministration and readily understandable. The present law might well be
characterized as an unsuccessful experiment in chaos.
Appendix
Section 2. Definitions.-The following words, terms and phrases when
used in this act shall have the meaning ascribed to them in this section, except
where the context clearly indicates a different meaning:
(1) "Tangible Personal Property."
(1) Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers and aircraft and all accessories,
supplies, parts, lubricants and equipment used in the maintenance, operation
or repair of such motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers and aircraft;
(2) Formal day or evening apparel and articles made of fur on the hide
or pelt, or any material imitative of fur and articles of which such fur, real,
imitation or synthetic, is the component material of chief value, but only if such
value is more than three times the value of the next most valuable component
material;
(3) All materials, supplies and equipment used in the construction, re-
construction, remodeling, repair and maintenance of any real estate;
101 See note 1, supra. Although both the majority and the minority legislative leaders were
apparently in favor of a general sales tax with exemptions, the legislative majority assumed the
responsibility for postponing consideration of such general revision of the act until the 1959
session of the General Assembly. See Legislative Journal, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Vol.
35, pp. 781, 806, 935.
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(4) Furnishings, appliances, supplies, fittings, ornaments, furniture,
equipment and accessories for home, business, industrial or commercial use, for
indoor or outdoor purposes;
(5) Business, industrial, professional and commerical supplies, equip-
ment and machines of all types, including parts and accessories purchased for
or used in connection therewith;
(6) Cosmetics, toilet preparations, toilet articles, drugs and medical sup-
plies,. except when sold on prescription;
(7) All smoking accessories and tobacco products, except cigarettes;
(8) Luggage, handbags, wallets, billfolds, Focketbooks, umbrellas, leather
goods and related articles, except leather wearing apparel not elsewhere in this
section defined as tangible personal property, but including fittings and access-
ories;
(9) Jewelry, watches, clocks, silverware, dishes, tableware, pottery and
related articles, but not including religious articles;
(10) Books, stationery and stationery supplies, but not including religious
publications sold by religious groups, Bibles, mail order catalogues and direct
mail advertising literature;
(11) Toys, games, hobby supplies, photographic and projection equip-
ment, and supplies, sporting goods and athletic cquipment and supplies there-
for, designed for a particular sport and which normally are not used or worn
when not engaged in that sport, bicycles and parts, accessories and supplies
therefor, pleasure boats and equipment parts, accessories and supplies used in
connection therewith, regardless of the use made of such property;
(12) Flowers, plants, shrubbery, trees, fertilizer, sprays and insecticides,
bulbs and seeds, and supplies and equipment used in connection therewith;
(13) Fuel oil and petroleum products for heating purposes; steam and
natural, manufactured or bottled gas;
(14) Hardware, tools, paint and painting materials, and equipment;
(15) Live animals, fish and birds (except when purchased as food for
human consumption), and supplies, food and equipment used in connection
therewith;
(16) Radios, television, receiving sets and receiving equipment, phono-
graphs, sound recorders, musical instruments or any combination of the fore-
going, and parts, components and accessories for the same, and records and
sheet music;
(17) Food and beverages (except when purchased at or from a school,
church or hospital in the ordinary course of activities of such organization)
when the purchase price of the total transaction is more than fifty cents (50c),
when purchased (i) from persons engaged in the business of catering, or (ii)
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from persons engaged in the business of operating restaurants, cafes, lunch
counters, private and social clubs, taverns, dining cars, hotels and other eating
places; when, in the latter case, the purchase is for consumption on the prem-
ises of the vendor, or when furnished, prepared or served for consumption at
tables, chairs or counters or from trays, glasses, dishes or other tableware pro-
vided by the vendor. For the purposes of this clause (17), beverages shall not
include malt and brewed beverages and spirituous and vinous liquors.*
(18) Periodical and other publications, but not including publications
which are published at regular intervals not exceeding three months, circulated
among the general public and containing matters of general interest and reports
of current events which are sold on a subscription or single copy basis.
Italicized provisions were added by the amendment of April 5, 1957, Act No. 24, P. L. 34.
* Prior to the amendment of April 5, 1957, Act No. 24, P. L. 34, clause (17) included:
(17) Food and beverages when purchased for consumption on the premises and when the purchase
price of the total transaction is more than fifty cents (50) from (i) persons engaged in the busi-
ness of operating restaurants, cafes, lunch counters, private and social clubs, taverns, hotels and
other eating places, except when purchased from a school, church or hospital in the ordinary course
of the activities of such organization, or (ii) persons engaged in the business of catering."

